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THE OFFICE OF THE CROWN
J.G. ALLEN*
ABSTRACT. A troubling veil of mystery still shrouds the central institution of
the British Constitution – the Crown. In this paper, I examine the modern
utility of five historical doctrines: the doctrine of the “King’s two bodies”;
the doctrine that the Crown is a “corporation sole”; the doctrine that the
King can “do no wrong”; the doctrine that (high) public offices are “ema-
nations” of the Crown; and the doctrine that the Crown is “one and indi-
visible”. Using some insights from social ontology, the history of office in
the Western legal tradition, and the sociology of role and status, I argue
that the first four of these doctrines can be refashioned into a conception
of the Crown as an office. An office is an enduring institutional entity to
which individuals bear a relationship from time to time, but which is separ-
ate from any individual incumbent and is to be considered in legal analysis
as a separate acting subject. Using the logic of office, official personality
and official action, I distinguish between the Queen, the Crown, Her
Majesty’s Government and the Commonwealth and argue that together
they provide a serviceable model of the modern British Constitution. The
final doctrine, however, must be abandoned – the Crown is plural and div-
isible and this must be taken into account when using the Crown to reason
about the UK’s relationship to other constitutional orders.
KEYWORDS: Crown, office, executive government, state theory,
Commonwealth, British Empire.
I. INTRODUCTION
The bedrock of the British Constitution is a conceptual scrapheap: the
Crown is perhaps the most important of our political institutions, yet it
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remains one of the least understood.1 The term is used to refer to the Queen
in her private and her public capacity, as well as to the executive branch of
government, potentially including the Queen, ministers and civil servants
within the administration.2 There is always a degree of uncertainty about
who and what, exactly, the term embraces. For example, the seminal case
of Town Investments v Department for the Environment,3 concerned a
lease signed by the Minister of Works “for and on behalf of Her
Majesty”. This prompted the question: “Who was the tenant of the prem-
ises?” Treasury counsel (Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson Q.C., as he then
was) exhorted the House of Lords essentially to abandon hope: the
Crown was an “amorphous, abstract concept”, “impossible to define”.4
Lord Diplock observed that “the Crown” had long been used as a metaphor
to signify when the monarch was acting in a public, rather than a private,
capacity, but that it risked confusion to speak of the Crown doing things
“which, in reality as distinct from legal fiction, are decided on and done
by human beings other than the Queen herself”. It was more appropriate
to speak of “the Government”, which term embraced “all the ministers of
the Crown and parliamentary secretaries under whose direction the work
of government is carried on by the civil servants employed in the various
government departments”.5
Ultimately, Lord Diplock was correct to focus on the Government as an
actor in its own right, but the shortcut he took – of simply speaking of the
Government without defining the Crown – causes us to stumble through a
cluttered landscape and, in the end, leads us in circles.6 Only by defining
“the Crown” will we understand what “the Government” means in our his-
torical Constitution. Indeed, defining the Crown is perhaps more urgent
than ever before. First, it is necessary to crack the old chestnuts – whether
(and why) ministers and departments are liable for civil servants’ wrong-
doing, why government debts attach to the public fiscus, how the Crown
relates to the “People”, and how different constitutional orders relate to
each other.7 But, second, it is also necessary to address topical questions
such as who contracts in the “contracting state”, who exercises the non-
statutory powers of the Crown, where those powers come from, and why
1 D.E. Smith, The Invisible Crown: The First Principle of Canadian Government (Toronto 2013), ix; see
also H.W.R. Wade, “The Crown, Ministers and Officials: Legal Status and Liability” in M. Sunkin and
S. Payne (eds.), The Nature of the Crown (Oxford 1999), 23.
2 C. Saunders, “The Concept of the Crown” (2015) 38 M.U.L.R. 873, at 875.
3 Town Investments v Department for the Environment [1978] A.C. 359.
4 Ibid., at p. 376.
5 Ibid., at p. 381.
6 Sir William Wade notes that Lord Diplock’s simple equation of the Crown with the Government cannot
be right solely by reason of the Crown’s historical immunities. Further, as noted by Peter Rowe, simply
substituting “Crown” with “Government” is insufficient to explain the position of the armed forces: see
Wade, “The Crown” and P. Rowe, “The Crown and Accountability for the Armed Forces”, in Sunkin
and Payne, The Nature of the Crown, pp. 27 and 267, respectively.
7 See generally J. McLean, Searching for the State in British Legal Thought (Cambridge 2012).
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judges are empowered to review them.8 The Crown, I argue, is an office –
an institution aptly described as a “corporation sole” that endures through
generations of incumbents and, historically, lends coherence to a network
of other institutions of a similar nature.
We have no shortage of conceptual material relating to the Crown, but it
mainly comprises ancient doctrines with a theological cant. In this paper, I
take five “dodgy doctrines” and explore whether they still have utility to
describe the Crown: the doctrine that the King has “two bodies” (one “pol-
itical” and one “natural”); that the Crown is a “corporation sole”; that public
offices and institutions are “emanations of the Crown”; that “the King can
do no wrong”; and that the Crown is “one and indivisible”. These heir-
looms are logically and historically difficult; they do find modern applica-
tion, but they do not meet with enthusiastic support and they have not,
generally, been put to good use. In M v Home Office,9 for example, Lord
Woolf opined that the difference between the Crown and an officer of the
Crown was important “in the theory which clouds this subject”, but was
“in reality” “of no practical significance in judicial review proceedings”.10
With respect, it may not be theory that clouds the subject so much as a lack
thereof: Lord Woolf squared the circle by saying that the Crown could
“appropriately be described as a corporation aggregate or a corporation
sole” without even specifying which one.11 While some diffidence towards
juridical metaphysics is healthy, it is not possible to understand the Crown
without deliberately grappling not only with its history, but also its ontology.
The alternative – looking at remedies and working our way backwards – has
failed to deliver for centuries.
I conclude that four of these five doctrines have some utility; although
they cannot be taken at face value, we can cut through the metaphysical
nonsense and fuse them into a workable concept of the Crown. Beneath
the mediaeval trappings, each hints at something important and most
hold an ounce of good sense. Applying some insights from social ontology,
I argue that the King’s two bodies and the corporation sole are ways of
expressing, albeit imperfectly, the idea that the Crown is an office separate
from its officeholder. The concept of office can also be used to explain the
nature of the ministers, Secretaries of State and civil servants who act in the
Crown’s name and to explain their relationship to it. This, in turn, provides
a framework for the rules of attributing actions to the Crown and liability
for official wrongdoing. What emerges is a clearer vision of the Queen,
the Crown and Her Majesty’s Government – if only we are willing to
put the concept of office back into the centre of public law. The notion
8 See M. Cohn, “Medieval Chains, Invisible Inks: On Non-Statutory Powers of the Executive” (2005) 25
O.J.L.S. 97.
9 M. v Home Office [1994] 1 A.C. 377.
10 Ibid., at pp. 406–07.
11 See Wade, “The Crown”, p. 24.
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that the Crown is one and indivisible, however, belongs on the scrapheap.
This maxim is, in my view, entirely inconsistent with the conceptual nature
of the Crown and the role it plays in various constitutional orders, and its
application is currently making bad law with regards to the relationship of
the UK to the Channel Islands, the UK’s dependent territories and the inde-
pendent states within the Commonwealth of Nations.
II. “METAPHYSIOLOGICAL NONSENSE”
In Cross v Information Commissioner,12 the First Tier Tribunal had to
decide whether the Duchy of Lancaster was a public authority under the
Environmental Information Regulations. It was referred to the Case of
the Duchy of Lancaster,13 which applied the mediaeval doctrine of the
King’s two bodies.14 The Duchy was hived off from the royal demesne
by Edward III for his son John of Gaunt. When John’s son became
Henry IV, the Duchy’s separation was confirmed, and Henry retained the
private powers of a territorial magnate separate from the rights of the
Crown.15 Like Town Investments, the case concerned a lease granted by
Henry VIII before his death, renewed by Edward VI, which Elizabeth I
then sought to avoid on the basis that Edward VI had been a minor
when he renewed the lease. For our purposes, the case confirmed that the
Duchy was held by the sovereign reigning from time to time in a discrete
capacity: Elizabeth I held certain rights qua Duke of Lancaster and others
qua Queen, and the patrimonies remained separate even though she only
held the former status in virtue of holding the latter. The case was decided
on the doctrine that the King “has in him two bodies, viz. a body natural,
and a body politic”:
His body natural (if it be considered in itself) is a body mortal, subject to all
infirmities that come by nature or accident, to the imbecility of infancy or old
age, and to the like defects that happen to the natural bodies of other people.
But his body politic is a body that cannot be seen or handled, consisting of
policy and government, and constituted for the direction of the people, and
the management of the public-weal, and this body is utterly void of infancy,
and old age, and other natural defects and imbecilities which the body natural
is subject to, and for this cause what the king does in his body politic cannot
be invalidated or frustrated by any disability in his natural body.16
Thus, Edward’s nonage caused no defect in the lease – the ideal attributes
of the King’s political body were held to cure acts of his natural body. This
12 Case No. EA/2010/0101 (First Tier Tribunal, 21 December 2010).
13 The Duchy of Lancaster Case (1561) 1 Plow. 212.
14 See E. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies (Princeton 1997).
15 See W. Hardy (trans.), The Charters of the Duchy of Lancaster (London 1845), 137.
16 The Duchy of Lancaster Case (1561) 1 Plow. 212, 213.
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is a dubious precedent.17 Nonetheless, the First Tier Tribunal applied the
doctrine to hold that the Duchy was “distinctly separate” from the
Crown, that the Duchy’s powers were “matters of private law” deriving
from the relevant charters, and the Duchy was not a public authority
under the relevant statutory tests.18
When he came to the Duchy of Lancaster Case, F.W. Maitland identified
the doctrine as the most marvelous display of “metaphysical – or we might
say metaphysiological – nonsense” in our law books.19 Elsewhere he
warned his students:
You will certainly read that the crown does this and the crown does that. As a
matter of fact we know that the crown does nothing but lie in the Tower of
London to be gazed at by sight-seers. . . the crown is a convenient cover for
ignorance: it saves us from asking difficult questions. . . do not be content
until you know who legally has the power – is it the king, is it one of his sec-
retaries: is this power a prerogative power or is it the outcome of statute?20
Before Maitland, Jeremy Bentham had savaged William Blackstone for
grafting the Hobbesian notion of the state as a persona ficta onto the doc-
trine of the King’s two bodies.21 Indulgence in fictions and mysteries, said
Bentham, should be avoided; we should focus on powers and the people
that exercise them.22 Bentham and Maitland find echoes in Lord
Diplock’s speech in Town Investments.
The doctrine rests on a problematic organic metaphor and has strongly
Christological elements. Most importantly, the early modern judges rou-
tinely failed to keep the King’s bodies separate.23 But there is something
to the idea that we should distinguish between the Queen’s private self
and the political role she plays in the constitutional order. Despite
Maitland’s warning, the doctrine deserves an honest appraisal.
17 The case concerned the capacities of the Duke of Lancaster – not the King (or Queen) at all. The ques-
tion boils down to one of rules of attribution and capacity. There is nothing illogical in saying that the
acts of a certain person suffering from defects of capacity such as minority, intoxication or insanity will
still be attributed to the Duke of Lancaster as a legal actor. However, it is difficult to justify why the rules
of capacity governing this institution should derogate from the general rule; for this reason, the judges
invoked the mystery of the “two bodies” and then proceeded to conflate those bodies.
18 Case No. EA/2010/0101 (First Tier Tribunal, 21 December 2010), paras. [30]–[43]. This ruling is also
dubious. The First Tier Tribunal held that the Duchy was not a “government department”, despite its
Chancellor traditionally being ex officio a member of Cabinet appointed by the prime minister; nor a
“publicly owned company”, despite it being a chartered corporation kept for the maintenance of the cur-
rent head of state; nor a “body that carries out functions of public administration”, despite it adminis-
tering bona vacantia within the Duchy and holding palatine courts.
19 F.W. Maitland, “The Crown as Corporation” in D. Runciman and M. Ryan (eds.), State, Trust, and
Corporation (Cambridge 2003), 35.
20 F.W. Maitland, The Constitutional History of England (Cambridge 1908), 418.
21 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, ed. Sharswood (Philadelphia 1893), Book I:7,
241.
22 See McLean, Searching for the State, p. 4; see generally J. Bentham, A Fragment on Government,
ed. W. Harrison (Oxford 1948).
23 See Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies, p. 12; Willion v Berkley (3 Elizabeth) 1 Plowden 235a, 238;
Calvin’s Case (1608) 77 E.R. 377.
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Many of our public law terms are indeed metaphors, rather than “observ-
able features of the world”.24 But metaphors are only problematic if we for-
get they are metaphors. Paradoxically, speaking of “the Government”
actually obscures the difficult questions, because a rational bureaucracy
of so many human beings looks so deceptively like a self-evident fact.25
The Government, however, is an institution with an ontology no less com-
plex than the Crown, and we need to explain how these human beings
together act as such. Nouns such as “Crown”, “Government”, “state”,
“Parliament” and “People” are all representations26; when we look for
their referent, we must actually look past the human beings to find a set
of social practices concerning collective action, organisation, representation
and accountability.27
Alf Ross put the point with the characteristic starkness of the
Scandinavian Realist school. If we say “Peter has signed a contract”, it is
clear that Peter is both the grammatical and logical subject of our sentence.
What is the logical subject where “The state has signed a treaty”?28 For
Ross, “the state” is a mystical entity that should be discarded, and we
should look at the rules of the legal order that creates it. The state, along
with the Crown, is a denizen of social reality, and so is its Government.
As Neil MacCormick so rightly observed, law and its creatures exist not
on the level of brute creation, but “on the plane of institutional facts”.29
In my view, the need to construct a respectable account of the Crown forces
us to develop a conceptual framework that also explains much about these
other institutions.
Ultimately, I think that Lord Diplock, Maitland, and Bentham are correct,
and that we should shift our focus to the Government as a corporate actor.
But some conceptual back-fill is required if we are to place our concept of
the Government on a sounder ontological footing. The proof of the pudding
is, after all, in the eating: more than two centuries since Bentham’s critique,
a century since Maitland’s and 40 years since Lord Diplock’s, it is simply
undeniable that we are no closer to answering “Who is the tenant of the
premises?” straightforwardly.
To borrow Lord Diplock’s words, the essential notion in the two bodies
doctrine is no more and no less than this: we must distinguish between “the
monarch when doing acts of government in his political capacity from the
monarch when doing private acts in his personal capacity”.30 But how,
24 See E. Rubin, Beyond Camelot: Rethinking Politics and Law for the Modern State (Princeton 2005), 15.
25 That is, a Weberian ideal-type bureaucracy: see generally T. Parsons (ed.), Max Weber: The Theory of
Social and Economic Organisation (London 1947).
26 M. Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford 2003), 157.
27 See A. Passerin d’Entrèves, The Notion of the State (Oxford 1961), 19.
28 A. Ross, “On the Concepts ‘State’ and ‘State Organs’ in Constitutional Law” (1957) 5 Scand.Stud.L.
113, at 118, 125.
29 N. MacCormick and O. Weinberger, An Institutional Theory of Law (Vienna 1986), 49.
30 Town Investments Ltd. [1978] A.C. 359, 381.
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exactly, do we do this? Lord Simon’s speech in Town Investments suggests
a different tack: “The Crown as an object,” he said, “is a piece of bejewelled
headgear under guard at the Tower of London. But it symbolises the powers
of government which were formerly wielded by the wearer of the crown.”
“Her Majesty”, he continued, is a symbolic phrase “betokening the power,
the ‘mana’, which is embodied in the person entitled to wear the crown”.31
This approach begins to probe the complex ontology of institutions like
Crowns and Governments.
III. PERSONALITY, CORPORATION AND OFFICE
The task, then, is to develop a framework within which we can speak of the
individual who is Queen acting in two (or indeed more) capacities. We
must be able to speak of other individuals – who we refer to as ministers,
Secretaries of State and civil servants – acting in a capacity separate from
their private selves, such that their actions are attributed to the political cap-
acity of the Queen or to the Crown directly.
Distinguishing between private and public capacity in this manner
requires us first to articulate a logic of action. This is necessary to explain
how I can act separately as a private citizen, as a company director and as a
police constable, for example. In all developed groups, some persons
acquire the capacity to express in action the will of the group.32 When I
act as a group organ, I act in a sense “outside myself”.33 Recall, in this
regard, H.L.A. Hart’s example of King Rex “giving private orders to his
mistress”34 and the similar point made by Thomas Hobbes.35 Returning
to the two bodies doctrine for a moment, those things which “appertained”
to the Crown and which “appertained” to the Duchy of Lancaster were held
by the King “come auter person”.36 Thus, although the judges later fudged
the line, the basic insight was sound: the King and the Duke of Lancaster
are separate rights-and-duties-bearing units in the English legal system. One
human being can act, for example by making declarations or promises, as
several persons, and (all else being equal) we attribute her act’s legal
consequences accordingly.
“Personality” has come to connote the full suite of attributes we associate
with adult human beings in Western modernity – self-interested rational
31 Ibid., at pp. 397–8.
32 W.J. Brown, “The Personality of the Corporation and the Personality of the State” (1905) 21 L.Q.R.
365, 369.
33 M. Fortes, “Ritual and Office in Tribal Society” in M. Gluckman (ed.), Essays on the Ritual of Social
Relations (Manchester 1962), 57.
34 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, revised ed. (Oxford 1982), 68.
35 “[F]or the King, though as a father of children, and a master of domestic servants command many things
which bind those children and those servants yet he commands the people in general never but by a
precedent law, and as a politic, not a natural person”: T. Hobbes, Behemoth or the Long Parliament,
ed. F. Tönnies (London1969), 51.
36 S.B. Chrimes, English Constitutional Ideas in the Fifteenth Century (Cambridge 1936), 352.
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agents with freedom of choice and full responsibility for what they choose
to do. This, however, developed later in the story of personality,37 and the
classical Roman meaning of persona was a guise, from Greek prosopon or
theatrical mask, in which one (literally) acted. As Bartosz Brozek explains,
the Romans did not equate the word persona with the word homo:
One man could, from the legal perspective, be many persons. As it was
termed: unus homo sustinet plures personas. It functioned thus so that persona
identified (some) legal status of a man, independent of their other statuses.
Romans could thus be one person as a Roman citizen, another as pater famil-
ias, yet other if they performed certain public offices . . . [F]or the law, a man –
depending on the legal context – wore different “masks”.38
Roman law never developed a concept of the true persona ficta, which
developed later in canon law and, later still, was adopted into the common
law of municipal bodies and business organisations.39 But the salient fea-
ture is that one homo wore many personae, and that his acts qua this or
that persona were treated as distinct in the law. Today, each persona I
wear (e.g. company director, trustee, Member of Parliament) generates
legal consequences that attach to that persona and not to any of the other
persona I wear, including my private self. The boundaries may be ruptured,
for example where I abuse an office and expose myself to criminal liability.
But communication between the legal position of different personae hap-
pens according to rules of attribution, not logical causality simpliciter.
Given the influence of Romano-canon law on the development of
English public law, our jurists adopted an ecclesiastical use of corporate
personality – the so-called “corporation sole” – to describe the legal nature
of officials.40 Alongside the “corporation aggregate of many”, the corpor-
ation sole was the incorporation of a social role or position to solve pro-
blems of property ownership and succession. (Thus Maitland quipped
that we had “personified” the King.41) Speaking of a social role as a “cor-
poration” is a way of expressing the idea that the role itself is an entity,
37 Brozek explains that many of the permutations were occasioned by the need to reconcile early
Christianity’s belief in a divine Father, Son and Holy Spirit with the monotheistic self-conception it
had appropriated from Judaism. See B. Brozek, “The Troublesome ‘Person’” in V.A.J. Kurki and
T. Pietrzykowski (eds.), Legal Personhood: Animals, Artificial Intelligence and the Unborn (Berlin
2017), ch. 1.
38 Ibid., at p. 4.
39 See J. Getzler, “Personality and Capacity: Lessons from Legal History” in T. Bonyhady (ed.), Finn’s
Law (Annandale, NSW 2016), 160, 163; M. Koessler, “The Person in Imagination or Persona Ficta
of the Corporation” (1949) 9 La.L.Rev. 435.
40 See H. Millet and P. Moraw, “Clerics in the State” in W. Reinhard (ed.), Power Elites and State
Building (Oxford 1996), 179; D. Lee, “Private Law Models for Public Law Concepts: The Roman
Law Theory of Dominium in the Monarchomach Doctrine of Popular Sovereignty” (2008) 70 Rev.
Pol. 370.
41 See Maitland, “The Crown as Corporation”, p. 33, and also the chapters “The Corporation Sole” and
“Moral Personality and Legal Personality’; F.W. Maitland, “Translator’s Introduction” in O. von
Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, trans. F.W. Maitland (Cambridge 1911), xi.
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distinct from its bearer from time to time.42 J.B. O’Hara explains that where
a corporation aggregate is lateral in time, treating many contemporaneously
as one, a corporation sole is vertical in time. Its members are each “one of a
series of single persons succeeding one another in some official position”.
The important feature is not that it incorporates a single person, because “it
is really composed of a number of persons who, one after another, hold the
same office”. The emphasis is on the “series itself and the seriatim succes-
sion”.43 Likewise Frederick Pollock described corporate personality as a
way of “constituting the official character of the holders for the time
being of the same office . . . into an artificial person or ideal subject of
legal capacities and duties”.44
Joshua Getzler suggests that the corporation sole is a redundant part of
our legal history that can be abandoned, as the law has “so many other
tools to create right- and duty-bearing groups and entities”.45 In a similar
vein, David Heaton argues that we can explain the nature of the Crown
without reference to the corporation sole, by using concepts such as
“trust, status, or office”.46 In my conceptual scheme, however, this is a dis-
tinction without a difference. To say that the Queen acts in an “official cap-
acity” is to say that the office of the Queen is a separate legal personality,
tantamount to a “corporation sole”. It is preferable to speak of corporate
personality, because in my view, it is all too easy to think about directorship
or trusteeship merely as a role assumed by a human being from time to
time. This understates the independence and endurance of the office as
an entity in its own right, for example through changes of incumbent or
even periods of vacancy.47
The constellation of Elizabeth Windsor, the Queen, the Duke of
Lancaster and the Crown offers an illustration. In the scheme I have pre-
sented, “Queen” is itself an office filled by an ordinary human being.
The Crown and the Duke of Lancaster are “stacked” on the office of the
Queen; Elizabeth acts distinctly qua the Queen, and the Queen acts dis-
tinctly qua Duke of Lancaster and qua Crown.48 (In our legal system,
42 Maitland thought that the idea of a corporation sole was an oxymoron and preferred to see the Crown as
a corporation aggregate embracing the Government and the whole political community. Maitland, how-
ever, was perhaps too influenced by the German organic theory of corporations – on the nominalistic
view I have presented, there is nothing incoherent about a corporation of one.
43 J.B. O’Hara, “The Modern Corporation Sole” (1989) 93 Dick.L.Rev. 23, at 25.
44 F. Pollock, Principles of Contract at Law and in Equity, 6th ed. (London 1881), 107.
45 Getzler, “Personality and Capacity”, pp. 169–70.
46 D.O.F. Heaton, ‘The Power of Government to Make Contracts’, MPhil thesis, University of Oxford,
2015, 112.
47 “The office] begins to exist when one has the institution of a permanent officium of which the ambas-
sador, provided with a general mandate, is the titulary during his assignment; and when the existence of
such an officium is not diminished if it should be temporarily deprived of a titulary, such as when a
vacancy creates the necessity of nominating a successor”: P. Selmi in D.E. Queller (ed.), The Office
of Ambassador in the Middle Ages (Princeton 1961), 76.
48 The Queen is ex officio Duchess of Lancaster – should Elizabeth II cease to be Queen, she would cease
to be Duchess, too.
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Elizabeth’s private capacity is almost totally eclipsed by the multiple offices
she occupies.49 This is evident in the fact that the Duke of Lancaster is a
Duke, regardless of the gender of the reigning monarch.) Similar logic is
necessary to explain a personal union of Crowns, and, as I explain
below, the British Crown’s life in various constitutional orders.
If we combine the sound elements of the two bodies doctrine with the
sound elements of the corporation sole, we arrive at a concept of office.
This conclusion is also drawn by anthropologist Meyer Fortes. According
to Fortes, office is a general feature of constituted political leadership,
essential to the management of the social relations of persons and groups,
and is present in all social systems. Comparing kingship in Western Europe
and West Africa, Fortes observes:
A jurist, I would take it, would say that office is none other than the corpor-
ation sole in another guise . . . [I]n connection with issues that are closely par-
allel to the conflicts of status illustrated by Ashanti chiefship, [Pollock and
Maitland] discuss the difficulties of sixteenth-century lawyers over the
king’s status. Was he to be regarded as “merely a natural person” or also as
an “ideal person”, a “corporation sole”? They conclude that the “personifica-
tion of the kingly office in the guise of a corporation sole” was, in the then
state of the law, almost a “necessary expedient”. And they refer back to a
much earlier state of affairs when there was no clear-cut distinction between
the king’s proprietary rights as king and those he had in a private capacity.50
Our task is to work with the concepts and terminology we have inherited
and to use them to craft the most rigorous possible explanation of organisa-
tion and leadership in our constitutional tradition. The common law is a
chop shop, not a design studio. We should neither take received legal insti-
tutions at face value nor shrink from hacking off their useless appendages.51
IV. OFFICE IN THE SYSTEM OF PUBLIC LAW
The term officium is a contraction of opificium, “the doing of a work”, con-
noting duty and service attached to a role. During the middle ages, officium
became the preferred signifier of organisational status as hierocratic theory
was used to explain the increasing institutionalisation of political power.
49 For the ability to act in a corporate capacity, the official “has to forego something of his own liberty of
action”: Brown, “The Personality of the Corporation”, p. 369. For e.g. a company director is unable to
undertake certain actions in his own right because of the status, namely he is either prohibited from
doing so or is deemed to act qua director when attempting to take advantage, say, of a corporate oppor-
tunity in his own right. See also Charles Duke of Brunswick v the King of Hanover (1844) 6 Beav. 2
725, stating that the King of Hanover acted separately qua King of Hanover and qua subject of the
Queen of the UK.
50 Fortes, “Ritual and Office”, pp. 60–61, citing F. Pollock and F.W. Maitland, History of the Laws of
England Before Edward I, Volume I (Cambridge 1923), 495, 502–03.
51 In this I emulate the method of F.W. Maitland, as explained by Joshua Getzler – attempting to master
inherited legal concepts by studying their genealogy, to gain some hermeneutic or internal knowledge of
archaic legal concepts, and to refashion the institutions, doctrines, and principles we have received to
“fit” with the rest of our contemporary legal universe. See Getzler, “Personality and Capacity”, p. 154.
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Transmitted through the ecclesiastical use of Roman legal institutions,
office was used to express the growing separation between the personal
attributes of a leader and his organisational function. Originally inter-
changeable with dignitas and ministerium, officium came to express the
nature and powers of those charged with a special role in the institutional
life of the group – up to and including the King.52
In Fortes’s account, office is characterised by six features. First, office
and officeholder are seen as distinct; second, offices are perpetual and entail
succession (an unoccupied office presents a potentially dangerous rupture in
the institutional order); third, offices have outward, visible regalia and insig-
nia, which objectify their powers and their perpetuity; fourth, officeholders
must conform to certain modes of behaviour connected with the office;
fifthly, offices have a mandate from society, through its other organs and
institutions, giving each office a moral and jural sanction to exercise its sti-
pulated function; finally, offices are conferred on individuals by means of
ritual, usually involving talismanic objects and symbols.53 All of these
are displayed paradigmatically in the office of the Crown.
We have not, however, developed a modern office-based account of the
Crown and its agents because the concept of office has been in retreat since
the mid-nineteenth century. Traditionally, offices were regarded as a form
of incorporeal property akin to rights of way, advowsons, franchises, digni-
ties, annuities and so forth.54 Relatively strong, centralised royal power and
relative political stability, had allowed a system of local offices to subsist in
England well into the early modern period, avoiding the strong feudalism
that led to the development (and theorisation) of centralised bureaucratic
states in Europe.55 These offices, however, impeded necessary reform of
the English civil service. Sir Norman Chester explains that from 1780 to
1870 the preponderance of ancient offices was suppressed, and most civil
servants were moved from an “office” to an “employment” basis.56
Rather than building on traditional legal controls over officials, therefore –
for example by characterising offices as property encumbered by a “public
trust” – office was cast off entirely and the new public service was erected
on a model of salaried employment and managerial control.57
52 See M. Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law (Oxford 2010), 26; P.D. Finn, Fiduciary Obligations
(Sydney 1977), 8.
53 Fortes, “Ritual and Office”, pp. 58–59; see also B. Schnepel, “Corporations, Personhood, and Ritual in
Tribal Society: Three Interconnected Topics in the Anthropology of Meyer Fortes” (1990) 21 Journal of
the Anthropological Society of Oxford 1, at 8.
54 See W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (London 1825), Book II:3, 36.
55 See M. Loughlin, “The State, the Crown, and the Law” in Sunkin and Payne, The Nature of the Crown,
p. 44.
56 This entailed restrictions on the performance of official functions by deputy, prohibitions on buying and
selling offices and using them for political bribes, abolition of the inheritance of offices in reversion,
removal of the “banking” function (whereby officials were entitled to draw on official receipts and retain
interest), and replacement of fee income by salaries. See N. Chester, The English Administrative System
1780–1870 (Oxford 1981), 122, 131.
57 Ibid., at pp. 12–24; see also P.D. Finn, Government and Law in Colonial Australia (Oxford 1987), 15–25.
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These reforms were necessary, but employment simply cannot replace
office. Despite the reforms to the content of public offices, many modern
civil servants are still “officials” at a conceptual level.58 In a seminal anthol-
ogy on the nature of the Crown, Robert Watt opines that civil servants are
employees of the Government, and he claims that “when looked at through
the eyes of an employment lawyer”, “there seems to be nothing to distin-
guish [the Crown] from any other large employer” save that some of its
employees undertake special functions. Nevertheless, Watt argues that
police officers and judges should be seen as a “secular clergy” in light of
their special delegation of power from the political community to act for
the public good in the absence of an employment contract. Although
Watt does not deign even to mention the term “office” in making his extra-
ordinary argument,59 his analogy is instructive of the continued need for
office - even in a civil service built on the employment model.
Office, as I have defined it, explains the special role that an individual
assumes within a broader social institution, be it ecclesiastical, eleemosyn-
ary or secular. This role enables her to perform actions she could not per-
form in her own right, exists as an enduring entity distinct from the
occupant and serves interests broader than the occupant’s own.60 Floyd
Mechem explains:
The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an
employment or contract is that the creation and conferring of an office involves
a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of govern-
ment, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; – that some portion
of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive or judicial,
attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the public benefit.61
It is difficult to determine whether a given civil servant is an official or a
“mere” employee,62 but denying the existence of office as a category
does not assist us. Whether an office is considered as “property” is irrele-
vant to this question, as are the mechanisms of appointment, remuneration
and accountability. It is not constitutive of “office” that it be considered, in
a given legal system, as an object of property rights, nor that selection be
otherwise than meritocratic, nor that it be supported by fees instead of a sal-
ary. The permanence and independence of office explains why the early
modern law treated offices as property, but being a species of property is
58 See B. Selway, “Of Kings and Officers – the Judicial Development of Public Law” (2005) 33 Fed.L.
Rev. 1, at 27.
59 See R. Watt, “The Crown and Its Employees” in Sunkin and Payne, The Nature of the Crown, pp. 310,
313–14.
60 See e.g. P.D. Finn, Fiduciary Obligations, p. 8.
61 F.R. Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers (Chicago 1890), I, §4, 5.
62 See also D. Lee, “‘Office Is a Thing Borrowed’: Jean Bodin on Offices and Seigneurial Government”
(2013) 41 Pol.Theory 409, at 419–20.
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a contingent property of early modern English offices rather than constitu-
tive property of office itself.63
Moreover, the Crown itself still needs a conceptual explanation, which
only office can provide. Even assuming that all civil servants be “employ-
ees”, who is their employer? We have come, full circle, to a variant of the
old chestnut in Town Investments.64 Formally, the employer is the Crown,
acting through one of its ministers. Even if we say that the employer is the
minister, it is obviously the minister in her ministerial, rather than personal,
capacity. Thus, to the extent that the employment paradigm displaces office
in the lower echelons of the civil service, it bolsters the importance of office
to explain the Crown and its ministers and Secretaries of State. Finally, we
need some framework to express the connection between the civil servant,
his legal employer and the public, which the employment paradigm cannot
do on its own.65
It is thus impossible to understand our modern Constitution properly
without attempting to understand its historical evolution. As Conal
Condren explains, office was a presupposition of early modern political
and legal theory.66 Our modern notions of the administrative state are dis-
jointed to the extent that they exclude it. Early modern attempts to under-
stand office were more sophisticated than we give them credit, and merit
modern attention. Blackstone, for example, described incorporeal heredita-
ments as things “issuing out of a thing corporate” which, not being the
thing itself, were “collateral thereto”, such as a rent issuing out of lands
or an office relating to certain jewels:
In short, as the logicians speak, corporeal hereditaments are the substance,
which may be always seen, always handled: incorporeal hereditaments are
but a sort of accidents, which inhere in and are supported by that substance;
and may belong, or not belong to it, without any visible alteration therein.
Their existence is merely in idea and abstracted contemplation; though their
effects and profits may be frequently objects of our bodily senses.67
In the more modern idiom of John Searle’s social ontology, “institutional
facts” are created when we represent a brute thing as “counting as” an insti-
tutional thing. This is a plausible explanation for something that is every-
where observable in the law, as well as in other conventional systems
such as religion. When a community counts a wall as a “boundary”, for
63 See e.g. C. Essert, “The Office of Ownership” (2013) 63 U.T.L.J. 418, describing the flip-side of the
medallion.
64 See e.g. Watt, “The Crown”, p. 293; M. Freedland, “Contracting the Employment of Civil Servants – a
Transparent Exercise” [1995] P.L. 224, at 230.
65 See e.g. Henly v The Mayor of Lyme (1828) 130 E.R. 995, 1001, per Best C.J.; P.D. Finn, “The
Forgotten ‘Trust’: The People and the State” in M. Cope (ed.), Equity Issues and Trends
(Annandale, NSW 1995); P.D. Finn, “A Sovereign People, a Public Trust” in P.D. Finn (ed.), Essays
on Law and Government, vol. 1 (Sydney 1995).
66 See C. Condren, Argument and Authority in Early Modern England (Cambridge 2006), 6, 25ff.
67 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book Reviews II:3, p. 20.
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example, the wall starts doing new things – not just blocking intruders
physically, but emanating “deontic powers” such as rights, duties, prohibi-
tions and permissions. These phenomena give members of the relevant
community desire-independent reasons for action.68 Consider the cippi
stones of classical Rome’s pomerium. They originally marked the extent
of defensive walls, but by classical times had become visual markers
only. Nonetheless, the pomerium emanated important deontic powers –
demarcating public from private land, marking where a general lost his
imperium, where a Magistrate might impose the death penalty, and where
Citizens were allowed to bear arms.69 The ontology of the pomerium
would be better explained by one of Blackstone’s crusty logicians than
by many a contemporary legal theorist.
Something similar happens when someone counts as a “member” or a
“president”, whether of a chess club or a nation-state. It is because
President Trump is President, not because he is Trump, that he wields
the power, say, to issue executive orders.70 Searle explains the logico-
linguistic operation involved as a declarative speech-act to the effect that
“X counts as Y in context C”.71 A woman counts as “Queen” where a com-
munity of people recognise the existence of that institution, where they
think that she is the person designated by the rules of succession, and
where has sworn her oath of office.72 As a result, Elizabeth can act in
the capacity as Queen, and when doing so holds many powers, rights, pri-
vileges, permissions – and also duties – that she did not hold as Elizabeth.
The Queen (distinct from either Elizabeth or the Crown) also serves in other
capacities, such as the Duke of Lancaster, the Queen of Australia and many
others.73 In R. (Vijayatunga) v Judicial Committee of the Privy Council,74
for example, an application for certiorari was made (in the name of the
68 See J. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York 1995), 96; G. Fletcher, “Law” in B. Smith
(ed.), John Searle (Cambridge 2003), 86.
69 See S.B. Platner, A Topographical Dictionary of Ancient Rome, ed. T. Ashby (Oxford 1929), “pomer-
ium”. Plutarch explains in Vitae Parallellae that Remus struck Romulus dead when the latter leapt
across the trench, which Remus was digging where his city’s wall was to run. Detlef von Daniels
observes that, by leaping across the wall, Romulus treated it as a mere wall as not as a sign of a
norm, and that this provoked Remus’s deadly retaliation: D. von Daniels, “Sources and Normativity
of International Law: A Post-foundational Perspective” in J. d’Aspremont and S. Besson (eds.), The
Oxford Handbook of the Sources of International Law (Oxford 2017), ch. 35.
70 See S. Shapiro, Legality (Cambridge, MA 2011), 75.
71 In this potted summary I have discussed only John Searle’s account, neglecting others such as Tony
Lawson’s, and I have omitted various complications and disagreements among social ontologists, for
reasons of brevity.
72 Sir Edward Coke held in Calvin’s Case (1609) 7(5) Co. Rep. 1a, 10, that coronation was only a solem-
nisation of the royal descent but not part of the “<Title>”. This principle, concerning the content of the
Searleian “C term”, was based on a case concerning whether plotters against James I could have com-
mitted treason before the coronation had occurred. It I hold generally, or else we would do away with all
need for formality. On the other hand, the requirement for a monarch (or other official) to swear an oath
of office would appear to be more substantive.
73 We can use this scheme to model the way that offices iterate, as well. We have said that X (Elizabeth)
counts as Y (Queen) in the context C, and that the Queen is ex officio the Duke of Lancaster. So we can
say that Y1 (Queen) serves as X2 in the status function declaration that creates Y2 (Duke of Lancaster).
74 R. (Vijayatunga) v Judicial Committee of the Privy Council [1988] Q.B. 322.
C.L.J. 311The Office of the Crown
Crown) against the Visitor of the University of London – which happened
to be Her Majesty the Queen in Council. The Court of Appeal managed to
find a way through the conceptual difficulties, but more straightforward and
logical solutions to such problems would be provided by a logic of official
personality and official action.
V. THE QUEEN, THE CROWN AND HER MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
Three doctrines remain – that public offices are “emanations of the Crown”,
that the Crown is “one and indivisible” and that “the King can do no
wrong”. As Bradley Selway explains, the common law adapted its old
stock of remedies to control the new bureaucratic apparatus, but the
response was unfocussed and incomplete. Instead of developing a coherent
notion of the emerging administrative state and its relation to the historical
Crown, nineteenth-century judges built a mess of hokey decisions around
these maxims. Today we still have to ask: Is the Crown a corporation sole
or aggregate? Does the Crown represent only one office in the Government,
or the whole Government or indeed the entire state? How are acts by indi-
viduals attributed to the Crown, and when is the Crown liable for wrongs
done by officials? These questions compound in difficulty. To answer
them, it is necessary to distinguish clearly between the Queen, the
Crown and Her Majesty’s Government, to reason through the relationship
of the Crown to its officers and its liability for their wrongdoing, and to
think carefully about what the Crown does and does not represent for
our political community.
Legislative reform was not guided by a more coherent logic of office,
either. For example, the Pensions (Colonial Service) Act 18 87s. 8 declared
that the terms “permanent civil service of the State”, “permanent civil ser-
vice of Her Majesty”, and “permanent civil service of the Crown” were to
have the same meaning. The judges, for their part, conflated the Queen with
the Crown, eclipsed all important offices behind the Crown (under the doc-
trine of “emanation”), and extended the personal immunities enjoyed by a
feudal sovereign to the whole of the modern administration emerging before
them.75 In other, more enlightened cases, the desire to avoid extending
75 See Selway, “Of Kings and Officers”, pp. 22, 31, 50. For example, Viscount Canterbury v Attorney
General (1843) 41 E.R. 648 held that the Crown could not be liable in tort for the wrongful acts of
its officers (on the basis of the then-applicable rules of vicarious liability – see P.W. Hogg and P.J.
Monahan, Liability of the Crown, 3rd ed. (Toronto 2000), 6); however, the case treated the monarch
not as an abstraction personifying the whole of government but as a person with special powers and
immunities. Tobin v The Queen (1864) 143 All E.R. 1148, on the other hand, held that “that which
the sovereign does by command to his servants, cannot be a wrong in the sovereign, because, if the
command is unlawful, it is in law no command, and the servant is responsible for the unlawful act,
the same as if there had been no command”. Perhaps most egregiously, Feather v The Queen (1865)
122 All E.R. 1191 held that “the maxim that the King can do no wrong applies to personal as well
as to political wrongs; and not only to wrongs done personally by the Sovereign, if such a thing can
be supposed to be possible, but to injuries done by a subject by the authority of the Sovereign”. See
Getzler, “Personality and Capacity”, p. 172.
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sovereign immunities caused judges to pass on opportunities to develop the
nature of office and the relationship between the Crown and its officials.76
Traditionally, the special status of the Crown as an ideal entity was
reconciled with the rule of law by insisting on the personal liability of
officials acting ultra vires.77 As the Crown could do no wrong, it could
not authorise wrongdoing, either; ergo the wrong must attach to the
official qua individual, not qua official. As Lord Woolf observed, as long
as the plaintiff sued the “actual wrongdoer” personally, he was unable to
“hide behind the immunity of the Crown”.78 However, this was not always
possible, and in practical terms depended on the Government indemnifying
the unhappy official. Conceptually, it led to a conundrum in which official
acts, as soon as they appeared unlawful, ceased to be official acts79 – what
Getzler calls a “special kind of damnum sine injuria”.80
What way out of this mess? The administrative state is a “network of
offices”,81 and it seems most sensible to characterise this network as a cor-
poration aggregate of so many corporations sole – including the Crown, but
also the Queen, ministers, Secretaries of State, and other officials which
derive their powers formally (if not always historically82) from the
Crown.83 There is no harm in calling this apparatus “Her Majesty’s
Government”, but we do need to be careful that genuflection to historical
form does not distort contemporary substance. To think our way out of
the inherited confusion, we need to take seriously the corporate nature of
the Crown and Her Majesty’s Government, and the logic of action inherent
in corporate personality.
Legal institutions can only act through human beings – an office without
an officeholder is inert. In Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd. v
Securities Commission,84 Lord Hoffmann observed that any proposition
about a corporation necessarily refers to a set of rules. These rules provide
76 See e.g. Gilbert v Corporation of Trinity House (1886) 17 Q.B. 795; International Railway Company v
Niagara Parks Commission [1941] A.C. 328; Farnell v Bowman (1887) 12 A.C. 643.
77 See Loughlin, “The State”, p. 72.
78 M. v Home Office [1994] 1 A.C. 377, 409.
79 See Harper v Secretary of State for the Home Department (The Times, 18 December 1954) (Sir
Raymond Evershed M.R.), cited in Merricks v Heathcote-Amory [1955] Ch 567, 574.
80 Getzler, “Personality and Capacity”, p. 172.
81 See Selway, “Of Kings and Officers”, p. 6; M.J. Braddick, State Formation in Early Modern England c
1550–1700 (Cambridge 2000), 11, 45.
82 See Maitland, The Constitutional History of England, pp. 39–54.
83 Lord Morris suggested that ministers, etc., be seen as corporations sole in Town Investments Ltd. [1978]
A.C. 359, 395. In Kinloch v Secretary of State for India in Council (1882) 7 A.C. 619 the Secretary of
State was called expressly “a body corporate, or something in the nature of a body corporate”, and “not
the individual who now happens to fill that office [but] the officer bearing that description” for the pur-
poses of contracting, suing and being sued – but, oddly, not for the purposes of holding property. A
fascinating exploration of this question from the late Austrian monarchy, not yet available in
English, is E. Bernatzik, Kritische Studien über den Begriff der juristischen Person und über die jur-
istische Persönlichkeit der Behörden insbesondere (Berlin 1996 [1890]) (translation: Critical Studies
on the Concept of the Juristic Person and on the Juristic Personality of Public Authorities in
Particular).
84 Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd. v Securities Commission [1995] 3 All E.R. 918 (J.C.P.C.).
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that a persona ficta shall be deemed to exist and to have certain powers,
rights and duties, but also what acts are to count as acts of the corporation.
This is as true of a political corporation, such as the Crown, as it is of a
private business organisation.85 There is no “Ding an sich”, so “[t]o say
that a company cannot do something means only that there is no one
whose doing of that act would, under the applicable rules of attribution,
count as an act of the [corporation].”86
The powers of a minister are formally derived from the Crown, and they
are exercised in its name. We can say “emanation” if we must, but we
should not take this to mean that the minister is actually part of the
Crown. Her Majesty’s Government is a complex corporate entity with
many parts. Rules of attribution provide that any valid act by a minister
shall count as an act of the Crown. But there need not be a relation of iden-
tity between the entities, nor perfect symmetry between rules of attribution
and liability that operate between them. Again, these questions seem clearer
in the mundane light of private law:
[T]he fact that a company’s employee is authorised to drive a lorry does not in
itself lead to the conclusion that if he kills someone by reckless driving, the
company will be guilty of manslaughter. There is no inconsistency. Each is
an example of an attribution rule for a particular purpose, tailored as it always
must be to the terms and policies of the substantive rule.87
Because the Crown acts (and acts only) through its officers (including in
rare cases the Queen), wrongdoing under colour of office should attach to
the relevant official – either in his personal or official capacity. Perhaps
we have reached a stage where it would be better to say that acts of the
Crown count as acts of (Her Majesty’s) Government, and accord the
Crown a place in public constitutional theory commensurate with its actual
function. In any case, governmental immunity has been abolished, or at
least seriously diminished, for some time,88 and questions of sovereign
immunity can be reserved for those cases actually involving the Queen.89
The matter is truly simplified by recognising the Queen as distinct from
the Crown, and recognising each of “Her Majesty’s” ministers and
Secretaries of State as a corporation, an acting subject separate from the
Crown, within Her Majesty’s Government.
85 In fact, the notion that corporations are “private” entities is a modern one, anachronistic to most of the
historical cases in which the jurisprudence of corporations law evolved.
86 Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd. [1995] 2 A.C. 500, 506–07 (J.C.P.C.).
87 Ibid., p. 512.
88 In the colonial Australian legislation, Finn explains that the question of personal versus official liability
of government officials turned, mirroring the private law of vicarious liability, on whether the tortious
act was authorised by (superior officers within) the Government, done on the Government’s behalf, and
subject to the Government’s control: see Finn, Law and Government in Colonial Australia, pp. 141,
152. Again, these are the right questions to ask, but they all assume definitions of Crown and
Government and a concept of office.
89 See Wade, “The Crown”, p. 28.
314 [2018]The Cambridge Law Journal
Paul Finn has described parallel developments in Australia, where
nineteenth-century colonial legislation enabled claims against the
Government as of right, using the device of a nominal defendant to hold
the relevant colonial government to account in a corporate capacity.90
Maitland approved – it was a “wholesome sight to see ‘the Crown’ sued
and answering for its torts”.91 But in Australia, too, legislatures shrank
from naming the Crown expressly, instead (pre-empting Lord Diplock)
using various formulations incorporating “the Government”, and the
judges, for their part, construed the statutes “under the shadow of the
Crown prerogative”.92 In other words, while the legislation demanded a
conceptual effort to theorise the new landscape – in which officers of the
Crown were stripped of their historical immunities and Her Majesty’s
Government entered the “liability calculus” as a player in its own right93
– these efforts did not eventuate.94 Nor did they eventuate in the UK follow-
ing the passage of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947; cases like Town
Investments and M. v Home Office show that “contradictions and loose
ends” subsist.95 Thus, although it is tempting to heed Lord Diplock’s
advice and simply substitute “the Crown” for “the Government”, this man-
oeuvre actually denies the republican direction of travel in the Constitution.
VI. THE CROWN AND THE COMMONWEALTH
The idea that officers of Her Majesty’s Government might be held to
account in a corporate capacity – and that compensation might be paid
from the public purse – leads to some final reflections on the Crown and
the abstract concept of the state. Even when defined as one component in
a more complex entity called Her Majesty’s Government, “the Crown”
implies something more than just the political capacity of the monarch.
Thus Maitland argued that the Crown, as a corporation aggregate, embraced
the whole political community and gave expression to the English concept
of a res publica.96 But the suitability of the Crown as a stand-in for a British
Staatsbegriff is contentious. Martin Loughlin, for example, argues that the
attempt to shoehorn the state within the Crown has compromised both con-
cepts.97 True, the Crown frames the concept of the state, as the unity of a
90 See Finn, Law and Government in Colonial Australia, pp. 141–55.
91 Maitland, “The Crown as Corporation”, p. 142.
92 Finn, Law and Government in Colonial Australia, pp. 145, 148.
93 Ibid., at p. 153.
94 See e.g. Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 C.L.R. 156; Communications, Electrical, Electronic,
Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v Queensland Rail
(2015) 318 A.L.R. 1 on the legal personality of the Crown in Australia.
95 Wade, “The Crown”, p. 24. The situation, Sir William argued, is even more dire in Scotland where
McDonald v Secretary of State for Scotland 1994 S.C. 234 interpreted the act as prohibiting certain
injunctive relief against Crown officers. On the Scots position see also A. Tomkins, “Crown
Privileges” in Sunkin and Payne, The Nature of the Crown, p. 174.
96 See Maitland, “The Crown as Corporation”, p. 38.
97 See Loughlin, “The State”.
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political community centres on symbols and institutions such as the Crown.
It is proper to recognise these symbols and their history in narrating the
myths of an imagined community such as a nation-state.98 But, in my
view, it is best to keep the Crown, which is still uncomfortably close to
the Queen, distinct from the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth – embra-
cing the organised political community and all its institutions of govern-
ment – is too large to fit within the Crown. It is preferable to see the
Crown as part of Her Majesty’s Government, then to reason about the rela-
tionship of an executive government to its political community directly, and
only then to draw conclusions about the relationship of the Crown to the
Commonwealth.
This requires some adjustments to traditional doctrine. Often, the British
Constitution appears more clearly from afar than from within these islands.
The Crown plays a role in several res publicae. The Queen of the UK is, ex
officio, Queen of Australia and of several other commonwealths. These
commonwealths are independent nations, but, unlike in a personal union
where one individual just happens to hold the office of a feudal sovereign
in two unrelated legal orders, the British Crown binds the UK and these
nations into some kind of whole. Further, the UK still has a number of
dependent territories (formerly “Crown colonies”) bound to it by the
Crown, and the Queen of the UK is head of the Commonwealth of
Nations, which contains numerous independent states including republics.
Already it should be apparent that the Crown serves an important organis-
ing role here, but that identifying the Queen with the Crown and speaking
of the Crown as “one and indivisible” might lead to confusion.
Our reigning monarch, Queen Elizabeth II, swore in her coronation oath
to “govern the peoples of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the Union of
South Africa, Pakistan and Ceylon, and of [Her] Possessions and other
Territories to any of them belonging or pertaining, according to their
respective laws and customs”.99 One might be forgiven for thinking that
she made this oath to the people of Australia (for example) and to the people
of the UK “come auter person”. But, sadly, recent House of Lords and
Supreme Court jurisprudence has pulled us in exactly the opposite direction.
The recent case of R. (Barclay) v Secretary of State for Justice (No. 1)100
illustrates the currency of these issues and the lack of clarity that subsists.
The Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction to review legislation from the
Channel Islands, although the Bailiwicks of Jersey and Guernsey have
never formed part of the UK and such matters should properly go to the
98 See B. Anderson, Imagined Communities (Brooklyn 1983).
99 See M. Kelly, “Common Law Constitutionalism – a Different View”, Australian Society of Legal
Philosophy Conference, Auckland, 23–25 June 2006.
100 R. (Barclay) v Secretary of State for Justice (No. 1) [2014] U.K.S.C. 54.
316 [2018]The Cambridge Law Journal
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.101 Lady Hale, however, estab-
lished jurisdiction in virtue of the fact that the Bailiwicks enjoyed “a unique
relationship to the United Kingdom and the rest of the British
Commonwealth through the Crown, in the person of the Sovereign”.102
Yet, in the same breath, she denied that the capacity in which the Crown
acted was even a relevant issue.103
The Crown can be used as a category to reason about the nature of legal
orders, and the relationship of legal orders to each other, only once its com-
plex, corporate nature is understood. The notion that the Crown is “one and
indivisible” is incoherent and should be abandoned.104 Lionel Smith observes
that the Crown in right of a Canadian federal province can make an agreement
or have a dispute with the Crown in right of Canada, and that the Crown in
right of Canada can make agreements or have disputes with the Crown in
right of Australia.105 The Privy Council has rightly said that while there is
only one Crown, it has multiple “purses”,106 and the Canadian Supreme
Court has upped the metaphorical ante to say that the Crown “wears many
hats”.107 Maitland cited American opinions treating the states of the US as
bodies corporate, noticing that the colonial charters of Connecticut and
Rhode Island called them “one body corporate and politic in fact and in
name”; he puzzled over why his contemporaries denied that a colony was a
corporation: “This seems to be the result to which English law would naturally
have come, had not that foolish parson led it astray.”108 The Australian states,
he said, did not use the term, but adopted a similar posture in their agreement
to “unite in one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth under the Crown”. A
body politic, after all, “may be a member of another body politic”.109
The Crown is plural and divisible, and the transition from an imperial to
a post-imperial Crown can thus be understood as a change in the capacity in
which the Crown is said to act in any given constitutional order. This is
broadly consistent with the position taken by the majority of the House
of Lords in R. (Quark Fishing Ltd.) v Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs.110 Unfortunately, that sensible position was
101 See D.C. Clarry, “Institutional Judicial Independence and the Privy Council” (2014) 3 C.J.I.C.L. 46.
102 They are vestiges of the Duchy of Normandy; William Duke of Normandy became William King of
England in 1066.
103 R. (Barclay) [2014] U.K.S.C. 54, at [6], [34], [36]; see J.G. Allen, “Jurisdiction and Devolution Issues”
[2014–2015] UK Supreme Court Yearbook 320, at 326.
104 P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto 2011), §10.1.
105 L. Smith, “Scottish Trusts in the Common Law” (2013) 17 Edin.L.R. 283; see Maitland, “The Crown as
Corporation”, p. 43. However, on the long quasi-colonial twilight of the Australian states, see
A. Twomey, The Chameleon Crown: The Queen and Her Australian Governors (Annandale, NSW
2006), 271.
106 Re Silver Brothers; A-G Quebec v A-G Canada [1932] A.C. 514.
107 Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada [2002] 4 S.C.R. 245, at [96], per Binnie J.
108 Maitland, “The Crown as Corporation”, pp. 43, 46.
109 Ibid.
110 R. (Quark Fishing Ltd.) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2006] 1 A.C. 529,
comprising Lord Bingham, Lord Hoffmann and Lord Hope, Lord Nicholls and Lady Hale in the
minority.
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abandoned by Lord Hoffmann in R. (Bancoult) v Foreign Secretary
(No. 2),111 and this direction of travel was entrenched by Lady Hale in
Barclay (No. 1). Lord Hoffmann was evidently swayed by a working
paper written in the wake of the Court of Appeal’s decision Bancoult
(No. 2),112 in which John Finnis opined that the UK and its dependent ter-
ritories form “one realm having one undivided Crown”, and that this gen-
eral principle somehow squares with the principle that Her Majesty’s
Government in a colony is distinct from Her Majesty’s Government in
the UK.113
Finnis argued that the post-1688 principle of responsible government
required, in the context of a dependent territory such as the British
Indian Ocean Territory (“BIOT”), that the Crown act in the dependent ter-
ritory the on the advice of Her Majesty’s United Kingdom Government, and
that that government could give no special weight to the interests of those
inhabiting the dependent territory. In effect (to use a somewhat cheeky ana-
logy), if the Crown is a holding company, the Commonwealth of Australia
is a subsidiary with its own board and own corporate interests, and BIOT is
a mere branch office with no corporate interests of its own.114 In my opin-
ion, however, Sedley L.J. was right to hold in the Court of Appeal that the
Crown had to act in a way that was imputable, at least in theory, to the good
of BIOT as a political community. The Chagos Island community is dis-
tinct, and has very little community of interest with the UK. If history
had been otherwise, the UK would have found itself bound by international
law to administer the territory on trust for precisely this reason. With
respect, Finnis’s reasoning rests on a dubious theory of political represen-
tation with neo-imperialist implications.115
While the Crown can be used to symbolise the unity of a political com-
munity living under common institutions of government, and even to
describe the relationship of different political communities historically asso-
ciated with each other under the umbrella of a defunct Empire, our received
notions of the Crown are not robust enough to serve as premises of deduc-
tion in this manner – no matter how compelling they look in Halbsbury’s.
Talk of the Crown and its realms should really be avoided in preference for
talk of Her Majesty’s Government and the (relevant) Commonwealth in
111 R. (Bancoult) v Foreign Secretary (No. 2) [2009] 1 A.C. 453, 458.
112 [2008] Q.B. 365.
113 J. Finnis, Common Law Constraints: Whose Common Good Counts?, Oxford Faculty of Law Legal
Studies Research Paper Series Working Paper 10/2008, March 2008, paras. [15], [17], available at
<http://papers.ssrn.com/Abstract=1100628> on 10 January 2013. Finnis cites the Fourth Edition of
Halsbury’s Laws of England.
114 Ibid., at para. [19].
115 It places the unlucky inhabitants in the position of “virtual representation” – they are deemed to be part
of a far-off political community, and have nominal representation in its democratic institutions, but they
have no effective voice. Such fictions have presided over the most important fissures between the UK
and its erstwhile colonies. See J.P. Reid, “Another Origin of Judicial Review: The Constitutional Crisis
of 1776 and the Need for a Dernier Judge” (1989) 64 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 963.
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situations like Quark, Bancoult and Barclay. Otherwise it is too easy to fall
into neo-imperialist nonsense. The first step is to accept that the Crown is
one of many offices that makes up the Government of many common-
wealths; then to identify which government and which commonwealth is
in question; and then to reason through the issues using the logic of
office, personality and action in light of the normative commitments of a
parliamentary democracy under the rule of law.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this article, I have attempted to fuse five problematic doctrines into a ser-
viceable, modern concept of the Crown as an office. I have stressed that,
despite historical difficulties with the concept of office, a respectable
approach exists within contemporary analytical metaphysics to describe
the way in which we bestow special roles on individuals, which then
assume an existence of their own. An office is an enduring institutional
entity that lends stability and permanence to a politico-legal order through
successive generations of incumbent. It fosters the development of stan-
dards of behaviour demanded of the officeholder from time to time, and
allows the community to act externally and internally as a collective
whole. Office thus provides a framework in which we can say – without
metaphor – that the Crown and its officers are “independent legal
entities”.116
Office, I have argued, provides a disciplined framework for describing
the relationship between the political community and its institutions of gov-
ernance. The nature of an office as an acting subject – a persona distinct
from its bearer – implies a logic of action that can be used to rationalise
the attribution of acts, actually performed by individual human beings, to
institutional entities such as the Crown and Her Majesty’s Government.
Significantly, this allows us to work through questions of personal and col-
lective liability for wrongs done by civil servants by reference to a modern
ethics of public service rather than the privileges and immunities of a feudal
monarch or the transcendent majesty of “the sovereign state”. On the view I
have presented, the same logic of action governs the Crown and all the
other offices of government. We can distinguish between acts done by a
minister in his “private” and “official” capacity, and by reference to the
office’s rules of attribution and liability we can determine whether the act
was a valid official act and, if not, what consequences it holds for the
office as such and for the officeholder as an individual. On this basis – with-
out doing undue violence to our historical Constitution – we can work
through legacy concepts that have caused so much confusion.
116 See Chester, The English Administrative System 1780–1870, p. 11.
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An “official” conception of the Crown is especially important in the
so-called contracting state, where the Government uses its capacity as a
subject of private law to pursue policy objectives,117 and in the light of
recent attempts to use prerogative power directly for momentous political
decisions.118 It is also necessary to make sense of the role the Crown
plays in representing the relations between legal orders associated with
the UK. The only doctrine that cannot be repurposed is the doctrine that
the Crown is “one and indivisible”. When used as a premise, this doctrine
leads to unsound conclusions and to a retrograde view of the UK and
related constitutional orders.
117 See T.C. Daintith, “The Techniques of Government” in J. Jowell and D. Oliver (eds.), The Changing
Constitution, 3rd ed. (Oxford 1994), ch. 8; see e.g. Williams (2012) 248 C.L.R. 156.
118 I have in mind particularly R. (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017]
UKSC 5.
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